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A CT
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In Trustmark Insurance Co. v. John Hancock Life Insurance Co., the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered an appeal seeking review of an injunction barring
the parties from further arbitration proceedings so long as a certain arbitrator remained a member
of the arbitration panel.1 The Plaintiff-Appellee argued, and the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division agreed, that having previously arbitrated a
dispute between the two parties over essentially the same issue, the arbitrator could no longer be
considered disinterested in the proceedings. 2 The Plaintiff-Appellee argued this partiality was due
to the arbitrator’s preexisting knowledge of the previous arbitration and the dispute. 3 The Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, clarifying that under §10 of the Federal Arbitration Act
(“FAA”), “partiality” means only having a personal or financial stake in the outcome of the
arbitration, and that mere knowledge of previous events or arbitrations or interest in
reemployment by the parties is not enough to establish partiality. 4

II.

BACKGROUND

Appellant John Hancock Life Insurance Company (“Hancock”) and Appellee Trustmark
Insurance Company (“Trustmark”) entered into an agreement under which Trustmark would
reinsure risks underwritten by Hancock. 5 The two insurance companies later disagreed over the
meaning of “London Market Retrocessional Excess of Loss Business” and submitted their dispute
to arbitration under the terms of the contract.6 A three-member panel consisting of one partychosen arbitrator appointed by each side and a neutral umpire found in favor of Hancock in
March 2004, and a district court later affirmed the award.7 In October 2004, Hancock
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commenced another arbitration action after Trustmark refused to pay any of the bills Hancock
had sent, claiming that the arbitral award alone governed all its dealings with Hancock. 8
Once the second arbitration was commenced, Trustmark argued that Hancock had only
secured its award by fraud because it failed to disclose four documents during discovery. 9 When
picking the arbitrators for the second panel, Hancock chose Mark S. Gurevitz, (“Gurevitz”) whom
Hancock had chosen in the initial arbitration as well. 10 Trustmark chose an arbitrator who had
been uninvolved in the prior proceeding. 11 Once the arbitrators were selected, it was necessary to
determine what weight to give the previous arbitral decision. Hancock argued the results were
dispositive, but Trustmark contended that the proceedings should be started from scratch, and that
the confidentiality agreement the parties had signed during the first arbitration prevented any
disclosure of the first arbitration. 12 Gurevitz and the neutral umpire agreed with Hancock, and
concluded that they, as arbitrators, were entitled to know the evidence and results of the first
arbitration. 13
Trustmark filed suit to vacate the initial court decision confirming the award, but having
been filed in 2009, the suit was held to be untimely. 14 Trustmark then sought an injunction to
prevent further arbitration so long as Gurevitz remained on the panel, arguing his knowledge of
the previous arbitration proceedings prevented him from being a disinterested party and rendered
him partial in the outcome of the dispute. 15 Under FAA §10(a) an arbitral award may be vacated
“where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators” or “where the arbitrators
exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award
upon the subject matter submitted was not made.” 16 Moreover, both the contract between
Trustmark and Hancock and general principles of arbitration require that the arbitrators to a
dispute be disinterested and impartial, such that the arbitrator have no financial or other personal
stake in the outcome. 17 Trustmark used this and the requirement of arbitrator impartiality and
disinterest to argue that because of his knowledge of the first arbitration, Gurevitz was rendered
partial and should be excluded from the proceeding because any decision he rendered would be
open to vacatur by a district court.18
The district court that heard Trustmark’s request for an injunction agreed, and held that
Gurevitz was not disinterested because of his knowledge of the first arbitration.19 In addition, the
court found that the second panel was not entitled to consider the decision made by the first,
effectively halting the arbitration.20 Hancock then appealed the district court’s decision.21
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III.

ANALYSIS

The main issue for the circuit court’s review was whether the injunction was properly
granted by the district court. An injunction, because it is a form of equitable relief, requires a
showing of irreparable harm – a showing that Trustmark failed to meet, according to the court.22.
The court concluded that the district court erred in finding that Trustmark had not agreed to
arbitrate the reinsurance of certain risks, it also held that there would be no irreparable harm done
to Trustmark by proceeding to arbitration.23 The only conceivable injury would be that of time
and cost. 24 Even if Gurevitz were later found to have been partial, Trustmark would not be
deprived of its ability to seek vacatur of the award in court under FAA section 10, and thus would
not have been caused any irreparable harm if the injunction was not granted. 25
The Seventh Circuit, in addition to finding a lack of the irreparable harm necessary for
injunctive relief, also took unusual and considerable steps to clarify the meaning of “disinterested
arbitrator.” 26 “Disinterested” adjudicators, according to the Supreme Court, are merely required
to be “lacking a financial or other personal stake in the outcome.” 27 The court then held that
Gurevitz’s knowledge of the previous arbitration did not constitute either financial or personal
stake, but merely the same reputational stake any arbitrator has in the proceedings he or she is
tasked with overseeing. 28 Next, the court made sure to clarify that unless an arbitrator has such
personal or financial stake in the outcome of the proceedings, he will not be disqualified from
adjudicating on grounds of partiality or interest. 29 Despite the assumption that he would rule in
favor of the party appointing him, Gurevitz was no different than any other arbitrator, or even any
other judge. 30 Adjudicators often have knowledge of the parties or disputes, and such knowledge
is not sufficient to disqualify them. 31 In fact, as the court pointed out, the district court judge who
issued the injunction was the very same judge who issued the order enforcing the 2004 arbitration
award. 32 Such knowledge is insufficient to disqualify either a judge or an arbitrator, as
“knowledge acquired in a judicial [or here, arbitral] capacity does not require disqualification.”33
The court then went on to clarify the higher burden set for disqualifying arbitrators from
adjudicating disputes. 34 While the parties involved in a suit cannot handpick judges, the rules of
arbitration allow parties to pick their arbitrators. Additionally, under FAA §10 only “evident
partiality”, as opposed to the risk or appearance of such partiality, is sufficient to disqualify an
arbitrator or result in the vacatur of an arbitral award. 35 The court then reasoned that where a
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valid bargained-for contract allows the parties to choose their arbitrator, a court should not
interfere with their ability to do so, provided all contractual requirements are followed and there
is no other reason to disqualify the arbitrator. 36 In concluding that Gurevitz’s prior knowledge of
the first arbitration between Trustmark and Hancock was not enough to show the evident
partiality necessary for arbitrator disqualification, the Seventh Circuit made clear the
requirements for a showing of such evident partiality and made explicit the need for either
personal or financial interest sufficient to render the arbitrator incapable of hearing the dispute
with disinterest. 37 The court concluded that barring a showing of such evident partiality by
Gurevitz, no irreparable injury would befall Trustmark should an injunction not be granted and
the parties are allowed to proceed to arbitration.38

IV.

SIGNIFICANCE

Trustmark is significant because the court makes explicit the requirements for arbitrator
disqualification due to evident partiality. The Seventh Circuit signals its reluctance to divert from
anything other than the narrowest view of what constitutes evident partiality and refuses to find it
other than where there is a showing of personal or financial interests in the parties or disputes. 39
The court in Trustmark makes clear its deference towards arbitration and its unwillingness to
interfere with bargained-for arbitration agreements unless a party can prove that an arbitrator’s
disinterest would be impossible.40 In essence, the decision in Trustmark makes clear to parties
engaged in arbitration in the Seventh Circuit that not only will it take a significant conflict to
disqualify an arbitrator, but that the disputing sides can select an arbitrator with intimate
knowledge of the parties’ businesses or previous arbitration proceedings without fear of
disqualification of the arbitrator or vacatur of the eventual award.41 The court also makes certain
that in the future all parties to arbitration will be aware of the Seventh Circuit’s reluctance to
interfere with arbitration proceedings. The decision establishes unless there is a clear case of
abuse of discretion or arbitrator evident partiality, the Seventh Circuit will respect the arbitration
agreement and not intrude on the bargained-for proceedings.

V.

CONCLUSION

While the majority of the court’s decision is a fairly simple matter of determining
whether any irreparable harm would befall Trustmark should the parties proceed to arbitration,
the court’s decision to go further and address the question of arbitrator partiality is a significant
step, as it was not an issue that needed to be addressed by the court.42 The court could have
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merely concluded that Trustmark would receive no irreparable injury should a stay of arbitration
not be granted, and left the parties to their own devices.43 Instead, the court chose to devote a
good portion of its decision to the accusations made by Trustmark that Gurevitz was a partial
arbitrator and should have been disqualified. The court, in forceful language, makes clear that it
will not take the opportunity to expand the definition of arbitrator partiality and will only step in
to disqualify an arbitrator where there is a clear case of evident partiality. 44 Moreover, the court
refuses to expand its understanding of such evident partiality, reinforcing the idea of arbitration as
a bargained-for contract, meaning that if the parties were silent on an issue, the court should not
be the one to step in and interpret that silence.
In coming to defend Gurevitz’s honor, the court also continues to make clear the stark
differences between arbitration and traditional judicial proceedings. The Seventh Circuit
unequivocally rejects any instance where a party would seek to narrow that difference, and to
either make arbitrators no different than judges, or to limit the amount of knowledge either could
have about a dispute. In its decision here, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals hews closely to
previous arbitration cases that staunchly defend the right of parties to choose arbitration, as well
as parties’ rights to contract for exactly what they get in the resulting decision. The court here,
instead of merely deciding the issue of whether the injunction was properly granted, takes the
extra step in chastising a party that it thinks launched a baseless and defamatory attack against
one of the arbitrators and makes clear its disinclination to involve the courts in arbitration where
there is not a clear and previously established statutory or judicial reason to do so. In addition, the
court warns other potential litigants that it will not allow attacks on arbitrator credibility to derail
arbitration proceedings unless the litigating party can prove one of the already established
indicators of evident partiality; that is, either personal or financial stakes that would make the
arbitrator interested in the outcome of the proceedings and unable to impartially decide the
outcome of the dispute.
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